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1. Introduction
The future of nuclear energy continues to be a hotly debated subject. Its present
status is significant. About 5.3 % of the worlds primary energy production comes
from nuclear sources, most of it for electricity generation which provides about
17% of the total generation. In Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere the
build up of nuclear power stations continues while in the US and now also in
Europe there is a stand still. Indeed, while the existing capacity continues to be
operated and, significantly enough, the share of nuclear power electricity
generation is highest there, up to about 70 % in France and Belgium, 50 % in
Sweden and Switzerland, no new orders are placed. But the end of the normal
technical life time of the operating nuclear power stations comes closer and
thereby the question of their replacement. Therefore the situation of the civil uses
of nuclear power is opaque and the question on its future role arises.
* Dave Rose memorial lecture, MIT, Mass. USA, April 20'h 1994
22. The global context of the 21" century
Today there seems to be no substantial energy supply problem for the moment [1]
quite in some contrast to the situation and the understandings of the seventies.
The most important primary energy source continues to be oil. Information on oil
reserves are reported by the World Energy Council for the World Energy Congress
in Madrid, 1992 [2].
Accordingly global proven oil reserves have risen by 10 % between 1987 and
1990 mostly by re-evaluations of already known reserves in the Middle East. In
other parts of the world there is a certain decline of such proven reserves, mostly
in the CIS states and Central Europe but to a lesser extent also in Canada and the
US. The 1990 Reserve to Production ratio is reported as 43 years which indeed
leads well into the year 2030. A different question is that of the down stream
situation of the oil industry. Reduced surplus production capacity in the Middle East
and an opaque situation in the CIS states pose problems and together with the
current low oil price lead into problems of the financial markets.
The case of natural gas is somewhat similar to that of oil. Also there the proven
reserves have increased by 17 % when comparing reported data of 1987 and
1990. Most of these increases come from the Middle East and the CIS states. The
1990 Reserve to production Ratio is 61 years, seemingly a most comforting figure.
The extended uses of natural gas are accompained by extensions and
modernisations of infrastructures for transportation and distribution which are large
problems by themselves. These problems are mainly the outcome of regional
unbalances with the need to arrive at an international gas trade approximating that
of oil. But here related time horizons equally lead into the first part of the next
century.
The case of coal reserves appears as stable, only some new assessments appear
as pertinent. For example China has made a reassessment leading to much smaller
3reserves than reported earlier. The 1990 reserve to production ratio is reported as
260 years, significantly larger that those for oil and gas.
So the supply situation looks at first comforting when seen just from 1994 under
more short range perspectives. Tab. 1 comprises these figures, it is taken from the
World Energy Council's publication for its Madrid Conference of 1992 [1].
However, these are the reserve/production ratios for 1990. A growing demand will
change that and increase at first the prices of oil and gas. Then, towards the
middle of the next century, it will drive the exploration into more and more
unconventional resources of decreasing quality. Athabaska and Orinoco are cases
in point. The temptation to do so will be very large. And this induces at least
potentially significant environmental damages or at best it leads into large
investments for appropriate abatement measures. The case of coal reserves is
somewhat different. Also in that case large scale abatement measures are required,
indeed, but the reserves let alone the resources are vast. The problem there is
transportation, either of coal as a raw material or of secondary energy such as
electricity. The cases of Russia and India are cases in point.
The question of the evaluation of the fuel mix has been studied in great depth in
the past. Table 2 and 3 give the results for the reference case of the recent WEC
study for 1990 and 2020. The lions share there is oil and gas, in spite of the large
coal reserves and resources. These numbers permit for the above made observation
of a critical dwindling of conventional oil and gas and thus for the drive into the
large unconventional resources of low quality or into the extend uses of coal.
An increase of the energy demand is a most direct consequence of the expected
population increase. While, again, this is a big topic of its own only a few
orientations are here in order.
Tab. 4 gives energy demands as reported by the World Energy Council [1]. Energy
demand has risen from 3306 Mtoe in 1960 to 8807 Mtoe today. The expectation
of a reference case (case B) scenario for 2020 is 13 359 Mtoe. Now, there is big
4controversy about energy demand expectations, descriptive and normative
attitudes are in conflict there. The WEC therefore has conceived four different
scenarios. Besides the reference case B there is a modified reference case B1
assuming "a weaker performance on improving energy intensity in the Central and
Easters Europe/CIS countries and a dramatically slower and delayed improvement
within the developing countries". And there is a High Growth case A and an
ecologically driven case C. Tab. 5 reports these scenario expectations for 2020.
It is now important to note that none of the scenario work (with one exception to
be referred to later) has extended its time horizon beyond 2030.
This comes out more and more as a severe shortcoming as it will be the period
after 2030 that will be dominated by the robust problem of population growth. It
is therefore appropriate to have a somewhat closer look at that period. Presently
the world population totals a 5.6 billion people. It is worthwhile to recall that after
the end of World War || there were only slightly more than 2 billion people and
- as we understand today more about global problems - it is fair to observe that
with the 2 billion people of 1945 todays prevailing problems of energy and others
appear as easily manageable.
The UN gives fairly disaggregated estimates for the years up to 2025. Its medium
variant for 2025 is a total of 8.46 billion people as compared with the estimate for
1995 of 5.76 billion people [3]. But the population growth must be expected to
continue. By the year 2060 as many as 10 billion people must be anticipated and
this implies already a slow down of the present growth rate which today is a little
less than 2 %. Most of it will take place in the Developing Countries, a fraction as
much as 90 % must be anticipated. It is not the purpose of this paper here to
elaborate on these population questions in greater detail. Instead it is the point to
qualify the future population growth with its growing dichotomy between
Developing and Industrialized Countries as the one dominating driving force for the
global problems that are already here and much more so for the problems to come.
A world population of 10 and more billion people is far away from an ecological
5equilibrium of one sort or another, it is unnatural exept when adapted by human
rationality and that is technology as an extension of original nature.
The other big and robust development that must be expected is increasing Global
Change. Again, it is not the point here to explain it in greater detail, much has been
written about it [4]. Global change includes the general spread of contaminating
chemical agents and radioactivity, the deterioration of soils, shortage of clean
water supply, acid rain and the declining conditions of forests, the changes in the
atmosphere with the damages to the ozon layer and the emission of CO2 and other
green house gases. As a matter of fact, a deeper understanding of Global Change
must include the now almost total global communication, both public and private.
Virtually every world citizen is already today in position to communicate with
almost any other world citizen and information is available in an unlimited fashion.
But at a closer look also epidemics, drugs and maybe other features should be
included. In general, the link of such global change to energy demand is complex
and not easy to analyse. But remediation and amelioration measures tend to
increase energy demand. The case of clean water supply is just one case in point,
there are others.
So, together with Population growth Global Change provides the context for a look
into the middle of the next century.
Above it was stated that all the scenarios referred to go out only as for as 2030.
However, there are the scenarios of Ch. Starr and Milton Searl [5] that reach out
to 2060. For a world population of 9 686 billion people and a share of 82.7 % in
the Developing Countries they expect for the trend scenario 33 182 Mtoe, for their
case of full conservation 19 084 Mtoe. The case of the trend scenario implies a
factor of 4.38 and the case of full conservation a factor of 2.52 when compared
with 1986 (that year is choosen here for reasons of consistency with the quoted
paper [5]). It is important to note that an increasing share of increasing energy
demand will be that for electricity and especially so in the Developing Countries.
Indeed, large scale uses of electricity will be one of the strongest components in
the development of the Developing Countries. This is illustrated in Tab. 6 which
6gives the primary energy share for electricity production for 1986 and two cases
of Ch. Starr and M. Searl.
This brings the reasoning here to the role of nuclear energy in the global context
of the 2 1"t century as nuclear energy is mostly relevant for the generation of
electricity.
3. Nuclear power at the end of the 2 0 'h century
As of July 1993 there were 424 nuclear power reactors in operation world wide
with a total capacity of 330 GWel. 72 more reactors are under construction with
an additional capacity of 60 GWel. That totals in 496 reactors with 390 GWel. The
nuclear electricity share was close to 17 % [6]. The present state of nuclear power
in the CIS is somewhat opaque. The above given figures assume for Russia 28
reactors and 19 GWel, for the Ukraine 15 reactors with 13 GWel and Kasachstan
with 1 reactor and 0.14 GWel. 18 respectively 6 reactors are under construction
in Russia and in the Ukraine. Such impressive capacity and performance is mostly
the result of the booming orders of the sixties and seventies. By contrast the
general situation for new orders is now somehow depressed as observed already
in the introduction. In the US there have been no new orders since the late
seventies. The market for nuclear electricity in France is saturated. In Germany
there have been no new orders since 1982 and in Sweden there is a moratorium
explicitly requesting the shut down of all nuclear power stations by the year 2010.
It is primarily in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan where nuclear power continues
to be built up.
In the seventies and still in the eighties the prevailing nuclear fuel cycle strategy
related to these reactor operations was reprocessing of the spent fuel, the use of
the separated Plutonium (Pu) in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) or its recycling,
primarily in Light Water Reactors (LWR). Such strategies were investigated in great
detail [7]. The underlying assumption was a continued strong growth of nuclear
7power. Now, in the midst of the nineties, it has become obvious that this did not
materialize.
Instead, a saturation seems to take place. This can best be seen if the present
growth in plotted in such a way that a logistic transition appears as a linear curve.
Fig. 1 demonstrates indeed such a linear curve. Its mathematical implication is a
saturation at 376 GWel, a figure not far away from the above reported actual 330
GWel. Until recently there was hope among the nuclear community that such
stalling would be only a temporary phenomenon. But now it seems to become a
tangible fact quite inconsistent with the expectations for contributions to world's
electricity demand in the next century referred to above.
If a saturation of, say, 400 GWel is now to be taken serious the question arises
what the strategic implications really are. There the first observation is that at such
a rate the supply of fresh natural uranium is not really a problem. 1 GWel requires
roughly 200 to/year of natural uranium for the supply of 30 tons of enriched
uranium. Such figures vary slightly with the technical parameters in question but
not very much. They are good enough here. 400 GWel therefore imply 80 000
tons of natural uranium per year. These amounts are indeed available. The
NEA/IAEA regards [8] in 1992 3.7 million tons of "known" and 13 mill tons of so
far "undiscovered" resources, a total of 17 million tons. For the 3.7 million tons the
1993 reserve/production ratio is therefore 46 years, that for the 1993
resource/production ratio years is 162 years. Such time horizons are large enough
to engage in fuel supply strategies like in the case of oil and gas. But they are by
far too small the reflect to real nature of nuclear power which permits for 10 000
years or more but indeed requires reprocessing and breeding [9].
The second observation is to expect a sound evolution in the design and operating
characteristics of existing reactor types [10]. Development and testing of High
Temperature Reactors and Fast Breeder Reactors was successfully demonstrated
on the prototyp level but failed to be introduced as commercial power reactor
units. LWR's of the forthcoming generation have somewhat simplified design
8features, a power level of sometimes only 600 MWel instead of the early 1000
MWel and improved safety features [11]. Existing but modern LWR have a core
melt down probability of 10-5/year. Earlier that was considered low enough to be
content with containment designs that reduce the probability of large radioactivity
releases by, say, a further factor of 102. The Harrisburg accident was of that kind.
But it was possible to envisage core melt throughs or Hydrogen explosions that
would damage these containments. The presently conceived German - French
LWR designs imply a reduced melt down probability target of 10-*/year, a core
catcher that prevents a core melt through and above all an improved double
containment that prevents quasi deterministically the releases of significant
amounts of radioactivity [111. As an example Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and 4 give an overview
of the safety features of the German - French 1500 MWel design that is foreseen
to replace the present LWR after their regular retirement early in the next century.
The reduction of reactor development to existing reactor types, mostly the LWR,
and the lack of orders of new nuclear power plants implies a severe reduction of
nuclear expertise, both in industry and in the National Laboratories in the US,
Germany and elsewhere. This adds to the solidification not only of the present level
of nuclear capacity but also of the present state of know how, a very serious
implication.
The third observation is the growing problematique of appropriatly handling the
back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Principally speaking there are three possibilities
for that handling:
1. One follows the route of putting the irradiated fuel elements after some brief
cooling period through reprocessing and uses the separated Pu for the first
core inventories of Fast Breeder Reactors. The separated fission products are
vitrified and put to final disposal.
2. One follows the route of direct disposal of irradiated fuel elements after a
somewhat extended cooling period at the reactor site. This may include
intermediate storage prior to the final disposal.
93. One follows the route of intermediate monitored retrievable surface or near
surface storage for a considerable period, say four decades or so, and
adjusts to the situation as it evolves.
The first possibility is the one that was traditionally followed by practically all
countries with significant nuclear power programs. The underlying assumption is
an agressive build up of nuclear power far beyond the present level of 320 or 400
GWel. Only Japan and France are following that route still today. It must be borne
in mind that this possibility indeed implies a truly large scale disposition of nuclear
waste of all levels.
The second possibility follows the presently prevailing saturation of installed
nuclear capacity. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that this requires the
opening of sites for the final disposal of irradiated fuel elements. If the second
option is for situations of a reluctant acceptance of nuclear power this might be
significant. 80 000 to of Heavy Metal (HM) content is somewhat of a typical figure
for a final disposal site. At 8000 to of HM per year worldwide it means the opening
of one such disposal site every ten years. By contrast, no such site exists today
anywhere. A somewhat special case is Sweden. Due to the moratorium there only
a finite and limited amount of the operation of the 12 Swedish nuclear power
stations must be accepted amounting to roughly 10 000 to HM and so there is
indeed a choice of a final disposal site imminent.
The third possibility follows the intent to buy time. Indeed, above it was explained
that the present relatively calm period of secured primary energy supply is due to
come to an end around 2030. It was explained further that in the midst of the next
century a world population of ten billion people with a share of 90 % in the
Developing Countries creates a demand for energy in general and electricity in
particular that refers heavily to the large scale uses of civil nuclear power. It is
therefore prudent and highly advisable not to foreclose a new and large scale
engagement of nuclear power. And this might require all the Pu contained in the
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irradiated fuel elements sitting in intermediate monitored retrievable surface or near
surface storage. The important point is now this:
Such large scale intermediate storage, necessitated by global population
growth, therefore implies an evolution from national to international global
strategies for the uses of civil nuclear power.
Presently the respective national outlooks for such storages are not very promising
exept for the case of Sweden and also Finland. Therefore the author has made in
1993 the proposal, to establish an "International Monitored Retrievable Surface
Storage (IMRSS)" primarily for the storage of irradiated fuel elements and
preferably under the auspices of the IAEA [9]. Indeed, the fuel storages at the
various reactor sites gradually run full and in the US there is word about the "98
syndrom" when these storages no longer can accept additional fuel elements, a
precarious situation. In fact, the situation for instance in Germany is not much
different: For example, the MOhlheim-Ksrlich nuclear power station of Rheinland-
Pfalz does not get the final operating license with the argument that the irradiated
fuel elements have no way to go while the exploration and preparation for site at
Gorleben, Niedersachsen, is impeded by the same political parties and groups. The
present situation is at a deadlock. The proposal is to overcome that on a more
international basis in view of the above stated necesssity to arrive at strategies for
the uses of civilian nuclear power that are international.
4. The merging of the back ends of the civil and military nuclear fuel cycles
More is to be said on the problematique of appropriatly handling the back end of
the nuclear fuel cycle though.
Since the end of the Cold War nuclear disarmament is taking place. The START I
and START 11 treaties provide for a reduction down to 3500 strategic nuclear war
heads in case of the US and 3000 in case of the former USSR within ten years if
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not earlier. As the USSR does no longer exist there are severe institutional and
political problems still to be overcome. But it is not the point here to elaborate on
these. Instead it is the point to refer to the material implications of the dismantling
of these weapons. Accordingly a total of about 120 to of weapons grade Pu and
800 - 1000 to of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is to be taken care of in case of
Russia, in case of the US it may be somewhat less. In addition there is weapon
grade Pu in the various stages of fabrication, it may be up to 20 to in case of
Russia and up to 15 to in case of the US. These amounts of Pu and HEU must go
somewhere. The use of HEU for civil purposes is not so much of a problem, it can
be deenriched to enrichment levels suited for use in civil nuclear reactors. In fact,
that is already taking place. The US has agreed to buy 500 to of Russia HEU for
11.9 billion $ over a period of the next 20 years. The case of Pu is much more
serious. It is a chemical element, distinct, and therefore chemical separation from
whatever the admixture is always possible. Recently the Committee on
International Security and Arms Control of the US National Academy of Sciences
has published a comprehensive study on the Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium [12], it has investigated that problem in depth. In that
study the various options for the disposition of weapons Pu are identified:
- the spent fuel option,
it envisages the use of weapons Pu as fuel in civil reactors in the form of the
mixed oxides, the MOX fuel.
- the substitution of civil Pu,
there is civil recycling of reactor grade Pu in civil reactors in some countries,
not the US. If weapons grade Pu is substituting for reactor grade Pu it is
more quickly down graded to reactor grade Pu than otherwise, that is by
sitting idle in the weapons grade isotopic composition.
- the vitrification option,
it envisages the mixing with fission products from High Level Wastes as a
way of self defense and vitrification for final disposal.
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- the deep - borehole option,
it envisages the disposition route for Pu that is already explored for civil High
Level waste.
None of these options offers a kings road. The spent fuel option and the
substitution of civil Pu requires time. It is not likely to get away with the military
Pu faster than in three or four decades. And it must be emphasized here: it does
require reprocessing. By contrast, as referred to above, the present trend of the
civil uses of nuclear power is getting away from such reprocessing, reprocessing
was the first, the traditional, of the above given possibilities for the handling of the
back end of the civil nuclear fuel cycle. The trend is presently towards the second
possibility, the storage of irradiated fuel elements. And vitrification and deep bore
hole disposition also takes time and it has significant uncertainties.
One should step back and reflect for a moment: Exept perhaps for the third option
all the other options imply a merging of the military and the civil back end of the
nuclear fuel cycle, the civil uses of nuclear energy facilitate nuclear disarmament.
This is a major observation as the military and the civil back end of the fuel cycles
were so far strictly separated. The end of the Cold War and Nuclear Disarmament
now changes that situation. But this will not take place easily and quickly.
It is now very natural to consider also in the case of military Pu from nuclear
disarmament long term intermediate storage. Such storage in it's various forms is
now being considered quite often. Also the report of the US Academy of Sciencies
considers that. Then safeguards is very necessary. In the early stages of the
dismantling of nuclear weapons when the handling of pits must be accomplished
a bilateral safeguarding between the US and Russia is necessary and practical. But
at some point such safeguards must be internationalized. This is definitly in line
with a forthcoming international Pu regime and much in line with the international
nature of the Non Proliferation Treaty that now comes up for extension in April
1995. It is for sure that in view of Article VI of that Treaty international safeguards
executed by the IAEA is the only way to go. And that leads us again to the scheme
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of an IMRSS, an "International Monitored Retrievable Surface Storage". It is now
very natural to merge these two types of IMRSS and to make it one. Indeed, also
the reactor grade Pu content of irradiated fuel elements pose, to an extent, a
proliferation risk. This has been clarified recently by the paper of J. C. Mark [13]:
Even a nuclear explosion whose "yield is nominally 10 kT or more but has an
associated fizzle yield of a few percent of its nominal yield - which is to say, some
hundreds of tons" is sufficiently of a proliferation concern. This now makes the
merging of both types of an IMRSS very natural. There should be two or three
IMRSS under the auspices of the IAEA for both: Pu from disarmament and, not
necessarily in the very same building or facility but under the same heading,
irradiated fuel elements containing reactor grade Pu. Only one such facility would
singularize that facility too much, for reasons of reciprocity two would be better
and more than three might be too many. But this is subject to debate.
Indeed, as nuclear disarmament takes place the two back ends of the military and
the civil fuel cycle are merging and both must go almost by necessity for
intermediate storages. And for both it is necessary and natural to do that under
international, global auspices, the military side of the IMRSS in view of the global
necessity to have international safeguards in fullfillment of Article VI of the NPT
and the civil side of the IMRSS in view of the global necessity to keep the nuclear
option open by buying time awaiting the 10 billion people of 2060.
There is one more point to it. So far an IMRSS for the storage of irradiated fuel
elements alone has almost unsurmoutable difficulties of finding a site. If nuclear
disarmament is to take place there will be sites for an IMRSS for the storage of
military Pu. Now it should be recalled that the two fuel cycles are merging and civil
nuclear Power is meant to consume the military Pu! Then it is impossible to leave
the civil side alone with it's siting problem: Accept the military Pu for the civil fuel
cycle but solve your disposal problem by yourself? So strange is the outcome of
the strict separation of both sides and that should be overcome on an international,
global basis.
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All this reasoning is for intermediate storage. Eventually the problem of final
disposal of residues in whatever form and of whatever kind must be solved. That
leads to the next topic of this reasoning, the final disposal of nuclear waste.
5. Final disposal of nuclear waste
The final disposal of nuclear waste is probably the largest problem of all, de facto.
Admitted, at a closer look one has to draw a number of distinctions, for instance
between Low Level Waste and High Level Waste and between other lines. Many
scientists, nuclear engineers and geologists agree that it is not that much of an
unsolvable problem in technical terms but when taken together with its
institutional, legal and societal aspects it has turned out to be presently the largest
problem that nuclear power users are facing.
Candidate for host formations for deep geological repositories are given in Table
7. But also seabed and sub seabed as well as deep well and bore hole injection and
rock melting disposal schemes have been considered.
In order to overcome the repelling complexity of the prevailing situation of the final
disposal of nuclear waste international organisations, all on the governmental level,
have instituted committees that studied the related problem in depth. Along such
lines the IAEA has stated and published "Safety Principles and Technical Criteria
for the Underground Disposal of High Level Radioactive Wastes" [14]. The two
overlying objectives of underground disposal of high level radioactive waste are:
- Responsibility to Future Generations
- Radiological Safety
The seven IAEA principles relate to the following topics:
- burden on future generations
- Independence of safety from institutional control
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- effects in the future
- transboundary considerations
- dose upper bound
- risk upper bound
- additional radiological safety
Besides those seven principles the IAEA his formulated ten criteria.
On this level of abstraction there is a general broad consensus. Further, only
recently the two relevant committees, the Radioactive Waste Management
Committee (RWMC) of the OECD Nuclear Agency NEA and the International
Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (INWAC) of the IAEA have
stated a collective opinion on the methodology and means for assessing the safety
of radioactive waste disposal practices and concepts. It has been endorsed by the
experts of the Community Plan of Action in the Field of Radioactive Waste
Management of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (now the
European Union) [15]. The two Committees
- confirm that safety assessment methods are available today to evaluate
adequatly the potential long-term radiological impacts of a carefully designed
radioactive waste disposal system on humans and the environment, and
- consider that appropriate use of safety assessment methods, coupled with
sufficient information from proposed disposal sites, can provide the technical
basis to decide whether specific disposal systems would offer to society a
satisfactory level of safety for both current and future generations.
Other countries or group of countries have stated similar positions [16], [171.
In spite of such comforting statements and consensus there is no country that has
already a final repository for nuclear waste or only a definite site for the later
construction and operation for such repository. And there is no agreement on its
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required timing. For the understanding of such contradiction it is helpful to consider
the present situation in three exemplicative countries, Sweden, Germany and the
US.
In Sweden for low and Intermediate Level Waste there is already a final
repository near Forsmark, north of Stockholm. It is operational since 1988. It is
positioned 50 m in granitic rock under the Baltic Sea roughly 1 km from the coast
line with entrance tunnels from the shore. So far as spent fuel elements are
concerned they are at first stored for about 40 years in the central interim storage
facility at Oskarshamn. That operation started in 1985 and includes a sea transport
for shipment of spent fuel as well as other radioactive waste. For the final disposal
of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste a repository is planned to be situated in
deep crystalline bedrock. The full scale operations are scheduled for 2020, the
start of the construction for 2005. The selection of a specific site is progressing
and will take place in the late nineties. The Swedish program gives a very sound
impression. Also, there are no major controversies in the public, at least not at the
moment. However, the basis for that sound situation is the official abundance of
nuclear power, the referendum to phase out nuclear power by 2020. What is at
stake therefore is the final disposal of the spent fuel and nuclear waste originating
from the operation of 12 nuclear power stations til their end of life. No follow on
nuclear projects are scheduled.
In Germany Low Level Waste is planned to go into the Konrad facility, a former
mine for iron ores and now, after unification, also to the Morsleben facility that is
situated in a salt dome. In the same general area there is the planned Gorleben
facility primarily for High Level Waste and with the related legislation to come also
for irradiated fuel elements. Exploratory work has started in 1979 but is now
constantly impeded and not really progressing, at least not satisfactorly. In fact,
in Germany there is hardly any progress in matters of the handling of the back end
of the nuclear fuel cycle at all. The federal system permits the German Federation
to be ruled by one party, presently the Christian and Free Democrats, while local
state governments are frequently ruled by other, opposing parties, the Social
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Democrats and the Greens. Social Democrats and the Greens are practically
blocking any action with the idea to create thereby a state of total frustration. The
implied goal is to abundon nuclear power totally and definitely. Only then it can be
expected that the necessary handling of waste and its disposal will take place as
it is presently the case in Sweden. The strong opposition to nuclear power in
Germany is fundamental in nature and far beyond the level of arguments or
international statements and consensus of principles and criterias referred to here.
In the US the progress for both, the HLW and the LLW disposals, is slow. Also in
the case of the US there are opposite positions of federal institutions such as the
DOE and local states such as Nevada, the case in point there is exploratory work
for the Yucca Mountain site. The DOE follows the Standards of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) 40 CFR 191. That results in an attempt to follow a
straight once through procedure whereby rules and criterias are predetermied with
the idea to have in the end a depository whose safety can be predetermied for
10 000 years in a way that can be defended in court. This has been critized lately
[18]. So, the US Congress has asked the National Academy of Sciences to have
a closer look at that document 40 CFR 191. Accordingly, in a report of the Board
on Radioactive Waste Management, Commission on Geosciences, Environment,
and Resources, National Research Council the observation is made that the
strive for a statement on predetermied safety for
10 000 years on scientific grounds is by itself unscientific as this and related
questions have broader implications beyond the scope of pure science. Therefore
an impresion must be avoided that such questions can be answered with pure
science. In that report Sheila Jasanoff is quoted to make that point: the political
need for accountability in the United States pressures regulators to seek a
"scientifically correct" answer, even when there is none [191. Instead, the report
of the National Research Council asks for a learning, iterative approach. As one
goes along it must be permitted to learn and to correct the coarse.
As a matter of fact such an adaptive approach is now followed in Sweden. It was
concluded that it is now time to complete research and development for a final
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repository and one of the two contemplated site candidates would now be chosen.
But the idea is indeed to progress in stages. Initially only 5 - 10 % of the total
amount of spent fuel in question shall be deposited and at first in the mode of
retrievability thus permitting for a stepwise investigation and characterisation of the
repository site. The long term safety must be demonstrated by a technical-scientific
assessment of the repository performance [20]. Quite in harmony with that
approach underground laboratory investigations are progressing.
The reason for the difficulties primarily around final High Level Waste disposal is
the long range time horizon and the associated uncertainties. Conscious human
history so far has basically covered 10 000 years and the human situation on that
time was hardly comparable with our present situation. A set of fundamental
questions must be dealt with [21]:
- which is the time span for which a Performance Assessment can reasonably
be performed?
- is it possible to perform a Risk Analysis in its proper sense for a geological
repository?
- how can we account for possible living conditions of future human
generations?
- how can we deal with possible future human impacts on the repository?
- how can we deal with uncertainties (in models, in scenarios, in data, in
parameters, in expert judgement)?
Above all, these questions must be handled not only in an arcane style but with a
real understanding and trust of a wider public. This requires confidence and trust
in persons, in institutions and a scientific-societal culture. It thereby does imply
reference to the feature that nuclear energy and its associeted problems is global
in nature. Trust and confidence must therefore be established in just that frame
and format. Indeed, the military side of nuclear power is a global matter since it's
inception, the Non Proliferation Treaty is a global Treaty, the accident of Chernobyl
has been a continent wide and ultimatly a global affair, the Pu regime as it is now
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forthcoming is meant to be global in nature. So also nuclear waste disposal must
be approached as a global issue quite in contrast to the present separated strictly
national approaches. But, significantly enough, none of the nations exept for
Sweden and Finland has succeeded so far. And this is not for technical reasons.
It is suggested here that this lack of success has a deep seated reason: nuclear
waste disposal must be seen as part of a more general pattern now evolving,
addressed as Global Change.
Indeed, the uncertainties, risks and resulting issues and problems cannot be
evaluated in the absolute, and this is a typical feature of Global Change. Strives for
the absolute lead to the pitfalls of our presently prevailing situations. Instead, it is
the comparison with the alternatives that is the responsible way to address these
issues and problems. Above we have seen that large scale uses of coal is one
alternative. Such large scale uses of coal are indeed accompained by uncertainties
and risks. The concern about the global climate is in the forefront there. If
unabated, continent wide impacts on the ecosphere must be expected and
especially so if the transition to low grade fuels as explained above take place. Also
the impacts of truly large scale hard technology of solar power covering hundred
thousands if not millions km2 of arid areas is obviously accompained by
uncertainties and risks. Presently we do not even can estimate the nature and size
of these problems. One may expect them to be comparable to the geopolitical
problems of oil supply from the Middle East.
One particular area of uncertainty, like in the case of waste disposal mostly as
perceived uncertainty though, is the area of health damages from radiation.
Accordingly radiological protection is of great importance and certainly a matter of
confidence and trust in persons, in institutions and a wider scientific-societal
culture. And so there is a prominent example for such an institution: The
International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP). It functions on a non
governmental basis, has a long standing high reputation and scientific as well as
public credibility and perpetuates its membership not by appointment of
governments but by peer election from within the ICRP. Obviously this has much
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to do with its early foundation back in 1925 on the occasion of the First
International Congress of Radiology. As a result, in 1928, the International
Commission on. X-ray and Radium protection was established. In 1950, in line with
the more general application of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials, the
Commission was renamed as the International Commission on Radiological
Protection [221. The ICRP's recommendations have since served as a basis for
national as well as international legislation and standard setting. Thereby ICRP
has contributed to bridge the gap between governmental actions and a strive for
confidence and trust in persons, in institutions and a scientific culture.
It was along such lines that the author has proposed the foundation of an
"International Commission on [Nuclear] Waste Disposal" (ICND) [9]. Indeed, such
ICND is not meant to substitute the successful committees of the IAEA and
OECD/NEA. As a non governmental body of high scientific credibility it is meant
to contribute to public confidence in nuclear waste disposal. L. W. Shemilt and
W. Hsfele have explained that ICND idea in some greater detail [231: "For
credibility and independence, such a new commission, international in scope and
composition be composed of recognized experts from disciplines deemed relevant
whose selection should arise through the most prestigious national and
international bodies. Specifically, national academies of science and national
academies of engineering should be the nominators, and possibly, selectors for
commission membership. Internationally, the International Council of Scientific
Unions (ICSU) and the Council of Academies of Engineering and Technical Sciences
(CATS) should be involved".
This proposal is presently under active consideration and evaluation.
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6. A Second Nuclear Era
After this comprehensive review of nuclear energy as it is understood today it is
indeed important to realize that there are advanced schemes for nuclear power
beyond present nuclear technological means.
One advanced scheme is that of a spallation source driven nuclear reactor
configuration. During the eighties there have been technical breakthroughs that
permit for new approaches, in particular it is the break through in the field of high
current low energy linear accelerators that is of relevance here. It permits the old
idea to drive a subcritical reactor configuration by additional spallation neutrons.
As such this idea is old. Reference must be made to the erarly work of B. W. Lewis
at Chalk River [24] as well as the work of M. Steinberg and coworkers at
Brookhaven [251 and others. Now C. D. Bowman and coworkers have reconsidered
that scheme in light of the new accelarator opportunities [26]:
A linear accelerator of 1.6 GeV projects protons into a lead target and produces
about 55 neutrons per spallation event. These neutrons are given to a nuclear
fission configuration which is well below criticality, say at 0.8. The resulting
richness in neutrons is then used to maintain the energy liberation through fission
and spallation, breeding and above all the transmutation of nuclear waste. In the
report of C. D. Bowman it is explained in fair detail that one such Spallation
Reactor of a given power level could transmute the long lived fission products of
ten normal LWR's of the same power level as the Spallation Reactor. This would
reduce the period of concern for the disposal of nuclear waste down to 300 years.
Thus it would fundamentally alter the profil of nuclear power uses. C. D. Bowman
suggests a reactor design using molten salts as fuel, D20 as a moderator and very
high thermal fluxes, 10"n/cm2sec. Of course this implies among many others,
problems of material corrosion resistance. These can be overcome probably by a
R+D program of sufficient size. By far the greatest obstacle might be the implied
chemical reprocessing which is meant to separate not only Thorium and Uranium,
respectively Uranium and Plutonium from the fission products but also a
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partitioning the various fission product isotopes, in fact a reprocessing of a higher
degree. The relevant technologies for such a Spallation Reactor lead clearly into the
next century and thereby into a Second Nuclear Era.
Of course, a Fusion Reactor belongs also to a Second Nuclear Era. The recent
advances in the Physics of Tokamak Fusion Reactor configurations have been
impressive and are well reported and known. It is only a factor of three or so that
separates the JET reactor from ignition conditions where the a particles provide for
the self heating of the D-T plasma. The next step, the international global fusion
project ITER, should reach the required targets of plasma physics. It is widely
known that after such an accomplishment the engineering problems must be
solved. This leads again mostly into materials development and testing and requires
in particular a strong 14 MeV neutron source. This does not exist yet, but it can
be done. And it is not clear that the engineering problems are all understood but
there is confidence that these can be overcome once the physics is fully in hand.
If a future Fusion Reactor can be made safe in handling the implied amounts of
Tritium and can be made not to produce long lived nuclear waste for example from
the structural materials involved and if the diversion of neutrons can be avoided by
design or operating schemes then also Fusion could alter the profile of nuclear
energy uses and thereby lead into a Second Nuclear Era.
Reaching the next century with advanced nuclear engineering and entering a
Second Nuclear Era requires steadiness, high level expertise from devoted
individuals and funding. It is presently not clear that these requirements can indeed
be met. But in taking relevant decisions in both, the public and the private sector,
the full picture of the energy situation in the 21" century should be looked upon.
Much is at stake.
23
References
[1] Energy for Tomorrows World,
World Energy Council
St. Martins Press, New York, 1993
[2] 1992 Survey of Energy Resources, 1 6 h Edition
World Energy Council
[3] Global Estimates and Projections of Population by Sex and Age, the 1988
Revision
United Nations, New York, 1989
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs
ST/ESA/SER.R/93
[4] Managing Planet Earth, Scientific American, Sept. 1989, Vol. 261, No 3
[5] Chauncey Starr, Milton F. Searl
Global Energy and Electricity Futures,
Demand and Supply Alternatives
Energy Systems and Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 53-83
[6] IAEA Reference Data Series No 1 and No 2, July/April 1993 Edition
[7] Nuclear Energy and it's Fuel Cycle,
OECD/NEA, 1987 Paris
[8] Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, 1992
NEA/IAEA
[91 W. Hafele
On the Nature of Nuclear Power and it's Future key note address
GLOBAL '93, Future Nuclear Systems, Seattle, Sept. 12-17, 1993
[10] Nuclear News,
a publication of the American Nuclear Society
Febr. 1990
[11] Wulf B~rkle, Siemens Erlangen, Germany
Der Europareaktor - ein deutsch-franzbsisches Entwicklungsprojekt
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, 23.09.1993
see also:
W. BLjrkle
"NPP Technology: Status and Lines of Development"
Nuclear Europe Worldscan (in publication)
24
[12] Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
Committee on International Security and Arms Control National Academy of
Sciences
National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1994
[15] J. Carson Mark
Reactor-Grade Plutonium's Explosive Properties
Nuclear Control Institute, Washington D.C., August 1990
[14] IAEA Safety Standards
"Safety Principles and Technical Criteria for the Underground Disposal
of High Level Radioactive Wastes"
Safety Series No 99
[15] Can Long-Term Safety be Evaluated?
An International Collective Opinion, OECD, Paris 1991
[16] Schulz: Ziele fOr die Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfslle,
Hauptabteilung fOr die Sicherheit der Kernanlagen (HSU-R-21/d)
Eidg. Kommission fOr die Sicherheit von Kernanlagen (KSA), 1993
[17] Disposal of High Level Radioactive Waste
Consideration of Some Basic Criteria,
The Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authorities in Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 1993
[18] Rethinking High - Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, National Research
Council, National Academy Press, Wash., D.C., 1990
[19] quotation in [18],
Sheila Jasanoff in "Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society",
Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle Hollander, eds.
Oxford University Press 1990
[20] P. E. Ahlstr6m and C. Thegerstrom
The Swedish route to final disposal
Nuclear Europe Worldscan 1-2, 1994
[21] K. K~hn, private communication
[22] International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1928-1988,
6 0th Anniversavy, Annuals of the ICRP, ICRP, BOXY No 35, Didcot, Oxon
Ox 11 ORJ, UK
[23] L. W. Shemilt, W. Hsfele
Towards a Global Commission for Nuclear Waste Disposal
International Conference GLOBAL '93 Future Nuclear Systems,
Seattle, Washington, US, Sept. 12-17, 1993
25
[24] B. W. Lewis
The significance of the yield of neutrons from heavy nuclei-exited to high
energies
Report AECL-968, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
Chalk River, Ontario, 1952
[251 M. Steinberg
Accelarator Spallation Reactors for Breeding Fissile Fuel and Transmuting
Fission Products in:
Nuclear Technologies in Sustainable Energy Systems,
Editors: G. S. Bauer and A. Mc Donald
Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York, pp. 203
[26] C. D. Bowman et al.
Nuclear Energy Generation and Waste Transmutation using an accelarator -
driven intense thermal neutron source
LA-UR-91-91-2601
Los Alamos National Laboratory, University of California, USA
Estimate of .Estimate of 1990Estimate of ProvenCumulative Reserves toReserves in 1990Production to1990 Production Ratio(Gtoe)Gtoe (Gtoe) Years)
Coal (Exclud-
.. n/a 496 197ing Lignite)
Lignite n/a 110 293
Oil 86 137 40
Natural Gas 40 108 56
Source: WEC Survey of Energy Resources
Table 3.1 Proved Fossil Fuel Reserves and Reserves/Production Ratios
Gtoe %
Coal and Lignite 3400 76
Conventional Oil 200 5
Unconventional Oils:
Heavy Crude 75 2
Natural Bitumen 70 2
Oil Shale 450 10
Natural Gas 220 5
Total (approx.) 4 400 100
Source: WEC, 1992 Survey of Energy Resources; WEC 1989 World Energy Horizons 2000-2020;
Masters C.D. et al, World Resources of Crude Oil and Natural Gas, 13th World Petroleum Congress,
1991; Masters C.D. et al, World Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Natural Bitumen and Shale Oils,
12th World Petroleum Congress, 19,87j
Table 3.2 Ultimately Recoverable Fossil Fuel Resources
Source: Energy for Tomorrow's World
World Energy Council 1993
Tab. 1
Fossil fuels: Nuclear Renewables: Total
I_ Coal Oil Natural Gas Energy Hydro. Traditional "New"
North America 508 809 497 145 127 38 34 2 158
Latin America 22 218 80 3 80 125 50 578
Western Europe 333 568 254 169 99 20 19 1 462
Central and Eastern Europe 156 49 64 11 5 4 4 293
CIS 365 378 569 47 50 26 11 1 446
Middle East and North Africa 7 167 117 0 5 21 1 318
Sub-Saharan Africa 68 38 4 1 9 141 6 267
Pacific 1  734 486 108 64 69 351 31 1 843
(includes CPA) (575) (100 (14) (0) (30) (218) (13) (949)
South Asia 126 60 25 ( 1 20 204 10 446
World 2319 2773 1 718 441 464 930 166 8811
1Data for the Packilc Region include Centrally Planned Asia (CPA), which are also shown separately.
Source: UN Energy Statistics Yearbook: WEC
Table C8 Fuel Mix in 1990, Mtoe
Source: Energy for Tomorrow's World
World Energy Council 1993
Tab. 2
Fossil fuels: Nuclear Renewables: Total
Coal Oil Natural Gas Energy Hydro. Traditional "New" Total
North America 400 793 601 188 162 46 147 2337
Latin America 79 483 296 26 235 179 99 1 397
Western Europe 352 534 354 244 149 20 73 1 726
Central and Eastern Europe 98 67 105 27 6 5 11 319
CIS 236 355 744 69 58 31 36 1 529
Middle East and North Africa 17 368 4 12 0 18 38 11 864
Sub-Saharan Africa 141 165 29 6 31 299 19 690
Pacific 1 1 423 797 342 203 191 414 112 3482
(includes CPA) (1 154) (273) (126) (40) (105) (257) (54) (2009)
South Asia 289 207 94 30 70 291 34 1 015
World 3 035 3 769 2 977 793 920 1 323 542 13359
Dala tor the Pacific Region include Centrally Planned Asia (CPA), which are also shown separalely.
Projection by WEC -Case B
Table C9 Fuel Mix in 2020 for Case B, Mloe
Source: Energy for Tomorrow's World
World Energy Council 1993
Tab. 3
1960 1970 1980 1990 2020
North America 1143 1762 1 991 2 157 2337
Latin America 162 259 431 577 1 397
western Europe 662 1 072 1 306 1 462 1 726
Central and Eastern Europe 135 229 336 292 319
CIS 441 732 1 085 1 447 1 529
Middle East & North Africa 35 70 162 317 864
Sub-Saharan Africa 92 142 208 266 690
Pacific1  510 806 1 258 1 843 3 482
(includes CPA)' (321) (374) (621) (950) (2 009)
South Asia 126 193 268 446 1 015
World 3306 5 265 7 045 8 807 13 359
Data for the Pacific Region include Centrally Planned Asia, which is also shown separately
Projection by WEC - Case B
Sources: UN Energy Statistics Yearbook, WEC
Table C4a Primary Energy Requirement, Mtoe
Source: Energy for Tomorrow's World
World Energy Council 1993
Tab. 4
Case A B1 B C
High Modified rence Ecologically
Name Growth Reference Refe Driven
World General Data
Population (millions) 8 092 8 092 8 092 8 092
Economic Growth 3.8 3.3 3.3 3.3Rate (% per Annum)
GDP (trillion US$)* 64.7 55.7 55.7 55.7
GDP per Capita (US$) 8 001 6 884 6 884 6 884
World Primary Energy
Total Energy Demand 17208 16 008 13359 11 273(Mtoe)
Energy Demand per 2.13 1.98 1.65 1.39Capita (toe/Capita)
Energy Intensity 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.20(toe/1 000US$) 
_
Primary Energy Mix (Mtoe)
Coal 4852 3814 3035 2128
Oil 4594 4532 3769 2898
Natural Gas 3 648 3 561 2 977 2 486
Nuclear 982 981 793 693
Hydro 999 987 920 661
Traditional 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 060
New Renewables 810 810 542 1 347
Table C17 Basic Data for the four WEC Cases
Source: Energy for Tomorrow's World
World Energy Council 1993
Tab. 5
Share of primary energy inputs for electricity generation
and total energy demand
*
% 1986 Trend full conservation
World 32 45 52
Less Developed
Countries 26 41 49
Developed
Countries 34 48 55
World, Mtoe 7573 33 182 19 084
Tab. 6
* data and notions based on Ch. Starr and M. Searl [51
FOR DEEP GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES
Tab. 7
FORMATION COUNTRY
Clay Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland (marl)
Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Sweden,
Crystalline Switzerland
Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands,
Salt United States (Carlsbad)























PWR Concepts: Status and Further Development
Frequency of release
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Safety Concept: Further Development in the Field of
"Beyond Design Basis Events"










o Retention of core melt within
containment
o Maintaining function of containment
in the short and long term





ig. 3 KWU N
SIEMENS
Mitigating the Consequences of Core Melt Accidents(Phenomena, Strategy and Actions)
Phenomenon Strategy and actions to be taken
Core melt Extention of reactor coolant system overpressure
at high pressure protection, i.e. safe transfer from HP to LP core
melt path by means of pressure relief (bleeding)
Direct heating Prevention of HP path
Steam explosion Energy release does not lead to consequential
damage
Hydrogen deflagration/ Implementation of structural measures to minimize
detonation amount of H2 produced (prevention of core melt/
concrete interaction)
Implementation of reduction system to ensure H2
concentration does not reach dangerous level
(ignition; catalytic recombination)
Stabilization of core Retention and stabilization in clearly defined
melt in containment geometry. Installation of a special dispersion surface
of retention facility.
Containment failure due to Prevention of unacceptably high pressure by means
high internal pressure of active cooling measures after an operator response
time (> 1 day)
Fig. 4 KWU N
